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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIVIAN ALLGOOD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 14094 
DELMAR LARSON, Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County and THE CITY OF 
SALT LAKE, 
Defendan ts-Appellan ts. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
NATURE OF CASE 
This case is an appeal from a decision ruling that the imposition of a jail sentence for violating Sec. 
32-3-3 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended, is in conflict with State 
law. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court held that Salt Lake City could not impose a jail sentence for trespass as 
defined in Sec. 32-3-3 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended. The 
District Court ordered the petitioner released from custody under a Writ of Habeas Corpus, after she 
had been found guilty of the charge of trespass in the city court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant Salt Lake City seeks to have this court reverse the lower court and hold 
the State statutes grant to the city power to impose a penalty of imprisonment for violation of Sec. 
32-3-3, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended. 
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FACTS 
Petitioner was arrested for trespassing by a police officer on the night of November 16, 1974, at 
Burningham's Truck Plaza, 2100 South 900 West, Salt Lake City, after she had admitted to a police 
officer she was not a truck driver and that she did not have written permission to be on the lot. 
She was charged with the offense of trespass in violation of Section 32-3-3, Revised Ordinances of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended, in a criminal complaint signed November 18, 1974. 
Petitioner was tried before City Judge Maurice D. Jones on December 12, 1974, and the case was 
then taken under advisement. December 17, 1974, the court found the petitioner guilty as charged 
and she was sentenced by Judge Jones, January 15, 1975, to serve six months in jail. Execution of 
said sentence, however, was stayed until February 15, 1975, to enable petitioner to present the court 
with a medical doctor's evaluation as to her physical condition. On January 21, 1975, petitioner 
appealed for a trial de novo in the Thrid Judicial District Court. On March 11, 1975, the court on its 
own motion ordered the appeal dismissed and remanded the case to the city court for execution of 
sentence because of the defendant's failure to appear. 
Petitioner then filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated April 8, 1975, and a hearing was 
scheduled and held April 10, 1975 before Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. At that time the District 
Court held that the City's trespass ordinance was in conflict with a state criminal trespass statute, 
basing its opinion on the premise that the City cannot impose a greater jail sentence imposed under 
its separate enabling power than that provided by State law under the State Criminal Code. The court 
therefore ordered the petitioner freed from custody. (R-7). 
This appeal was filed May 8, 1975, and the matter is now before the Supreme Court, pursuant to 
Art. VIII, Sec. 9 of the Utah Constitution. (R-10). 
ARGUMENT 
SECTIONS 10-8-84 AND 10-8-50, UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, SPECIFICALLY GRANT 
UTAH CITIES THE POWER TO PROVIDE FOR AND PUNISH THE OFFENSE OF 
TRESPASS BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BY BOTH SUCH FINE AND 
IMPRISONMENT; THUS, SALT LAKE CITY'S TRESPASS ORDINANCE IS NOT 
IN CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW SINCE THE LEGISLATURE HAS GRANTED 
SPECIFIC POWERS TO THE CITY TO ENACT ITS TRESPASS ORDINANCE AND 
TO PROVIDE FOR PUNISHMENT BY IMPRISONMENT. 
The City ordinances in question provide in part that it is: 
44
 . . . unlawful for any person to take down any fence, or to let down any bars, or to 
open any gate so as to expose any enclosure, or to ride, drive, walk, lodge, or camp or 
sleep upon the premises of another without the permission of the owner or occupant 
thereof." 32-3-3, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended. 
(Reproduced as Exhibit " A " of this brief.) 
The State Legislature has specifically granted power to the City to prohibit criminal trespass. 
Section 10-8-50, Utah Code Ann. 1953, states that cities have the power to: 
" . . . provide for the punishment of trespass and such other petty offenses as the 
board of commissioners or city council may deem proper." (Emphasis added). 
In conjunction with this specific grant of power to punish the offense of trespass, the Legislature 
also provided: 
"They (cities) may pass all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, not 
repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all powers and duties 
conferred by this chapter . . . and may enforce obedience to such ordinances with such 
fines or penalties as they may deem proper; provided, that the punishment of any offense 
shall be by fine in any sum less than $300 or by imprisonment not to exceed six months, 
or by both such fine and imprisonment.99Sec. 10-8-84, Utah Code Ann. 1953. (Emphasis 
added). 
In accordance with these statutes, the City adopted Section 26-1-8, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 1965, which provides: 
"Whenever no other penalty is prescribed any person convicted of violating any 
provision of any ordinance in these revised ordinances, or ordinances hereafter enacted, 
shall be punished by a fine in any sum not exceeding two hundred ninety-nine dollars, or 
by imprisonment in the city jail for a period not longer than six months, or by both such 
fine and imprisonment.'' 
Thus, it is clear that the State Legislature granted to the City, not only broad powers to define and 
prescribe crime and anti-social conduct as long as such city ordinances were not repugnant to law, 
but also granted to the cities specific powers to deal with the offense of trespass. Therefore, the City 
trespass ordinance and the jail sentence imposed by Judge Jones for a violation thereof, is clearly 
legal and within the powers vested in the City by State law. 
Further, it is to be noted that this court has, on numerous occasions, held that the cities may 
legislate in the same areas as the State where, as here, the Legislature has given either a specific or a 
general grant of authority; it has stated: 
"It is a well-established principle in this state that the city has the right to legislate on 
the same subject as a state statute where either the general police power or express grant 
of authority is conferred upon the municipalities." Cases cited therein. Salt Lake City v. 
Allred, 20 U.2d 298, 437 P.2d 434, 436 (1968). 
One of the decisions on which this court based its holding in Allred, supra, was Salt Lake City v. 
Kusse, 97 U.113, 93 P.2d 671 (1939). In Kusse, supra, the defendant was convicted of violating a city 
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ordinance prohibiting the driving of an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
The defendant there claimed that the City had no authority to pass an ordinance prohibiting driving 
an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor since the State had already passed a 
statute to that effect. The court held that the grant of general police power to cities, (under Sec. 
15-8-84, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, which is identical to the present Section 10-10-84, Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, quoted in part above), authorized the City to pass an ordinance to prevent driving 
under the influence of intoxicating liquors. Addressing itself to the issue of whether the cities have 
the right to legislate in an area covered by State statute, this court in Kusse, supra adopted the 
following test: 
" 'In determining whether an ordinance is in "conflict" with general laws, the test is 
whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, 
and vice versa.' Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519. Judged by 
such a test, an ordinance is in conflict if it forbids that which the statute permits." State 
v. Carran, 133 Ohio St. 50, 11 N.E.2e 245, 246. 
'The statute, as well as the ordinance, in the case at bar, is prohibitory, and the 
difference between them is only that the ordinance goes farther in its prohibition — but 
not counter to the prohibition under the statute. The city does not attempt to authorize by 
this ordinance what the Legislature has forbidden; nor does it forbid what the Legislature 
has expressly licensed, authorized, or required. * * * Unless legislative provisions are 
contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not to be deemed inconsistent 
because of mere lack of uniformity in detail." Id, at p. 673. 
Thus, the court concluded that in determining whether an ordinance is in conflict with the laws of 
the State, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the State forbids or protects 
or vice versa. In the instant case, the ordinance in question clearly meets this test in that it neither 
permits that which the statute forbids nor does it forbid that which the statute specifically allows. 
Allred, supra, and Kusse, supra, clearly establish as the law of this state that cities may legislate on 
the same subjects as those covered by State statutes and are precluded from doing so, only if 
expressly prohibited by statute or if the ordinance is inconsistent with the general law. In the instant 
case, not only are there no prohibitions precluding the City from enacting its trespass ordinance, but 
as has been shown, the Legislature has granted the City specific power to provide for and punish by 
imprisonment the offense of trespass. 
The most significant Utah case dealing with the issue of whether an ordinance is in conflict with 
general law is State v. Salt Lake City, 21 U.2d 318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968). This court held in that case 
that a Salt Lake City ordinance regulating the licensing of non-profit social clubs was in violation of 
Art. XI, Sec. 5 of the Utah Constitution which limits the powers of cities to: 
" . . . the authority to exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs, and to adopt 
and enforce within its limits, local police, sanitary and similar regulations not in conflict 
with general law. . . . " Id. at p. 693. 
In finding that a conflict did exist, the court expanded the test announced in Kusse, supra, as 
follows: 
"There is a relevant distinction which should be observed: where the legislature 
imposes the requirement of doing some affirmative action, such as obtaining a license or 
charter, upon a citizen, it may be implied that the legislature intended that the cities and 
counties shall not require him to do more. In contrast, where the legislature prohibits the 
citizens from doing some act, there is no basis to imply that the legislature intended that 
cities and counties should not add additional prohibitions. This concept is in accordance 
with Salt Lake City v. Kusse, where this court in commenting on various tests to 
determine whether there is a conflict between the statute and the ordinance quoted with 
approval the following: 
4
 . . . the city does not attempt to authorize by this ordinance what the legislature has 
forbidden; nor does it forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized or 
required . . . ' " (Emphasis added) State v. Salt Lake City, Supra at p. 694. 
It seems plain from the above holding that the placing of additional prohibitions along side a 
statute already prohibitive in nature is clearly permissible, even in the face of a constitutional 
provision restricting the passage of local law "in conflict with general law." It is clear in the instant 
case by applying the above test that since the trespass statute in question prohibits the doing of 
some act, then the City is authorized to "add additional prohibitions in the enactment of its 
ordinance." 
The Supreme Court of Kansas in addressing this same issue in Junction City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495, 
532 P.2d 1292 (1975) upheld a municipal ordinance dealing with certain uses of hand guns and knives 
as not being in conflict with state law where the ordinance was more restrictive and stringent than the 
state law dealing with the same subjects. 
The only remaining question in this appeal then is the alleged conflict arising from the fact that the 
City has been given specific authority to impose a jail sentence while the State Code provides that 
criminal trespass is an infraction for which no jail sentence may be imposed. See, Sections 76-6-206, 
76-3-205, Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
However, both the City ordinance and State statute have as a common purpose, the control of 
trespass and are closely related in terms, language and intent. The mere fact that the ordinance in 
question imposes a stricter penalty than that provided by State law, by itself, is not enough to vitiate 
the ordinance. Regarding this point, McQuillin states: 
"Where the unlawful act may be an offense both the state and the municipal 
corporation, decisions exist to the effect that the penalty of the ordinance, where it is not 
otherwise limited to such extent, may be greater than that provided in the state statute. 
. . . Clearly, of course, a statutory penalty may be exceeded or increased by the penalty 
of an ordinance where power to impose such penalty by ordinance has been expressly 
given. "(Emphasis added) 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §17.15, p. 328, 329 (3rd 
Ed.). 
In City of Columbus v. Molt, 36 Ohio St.2d 94, 304 N.E.2d 245 (1973), the Ohio Supreme Court 
held that the city ordinance for reckless operation of a motor vehicle which imposed a stricter penalty 
than that provided for under state law for the same offense was upheld as valid and not in conflict 
with the general laws of the state. 
In an earlier case, Village of West Jefferson v. Robinson, 1 Ohio St.2d 113, 205 N.E.2d 382 (1965), 
the Ohio Supreme Court held the words "general laws" to mean "statutes setting forth police, 
sanitary or other similar regulations and not statutes which purport only to grant or to limit the 
legislative powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or enforce police, sanitary or other similar 
regulations." Id. at p. 386. This definition of "general laws" was based on the holding in the case of 
Village of Strut hers v. Sokol, supra, which was adopted and cited as the law of this state in Salt Lake 
City v. Kusse, supra. Thus, the ordinance in question is not in conflict with the general laws of this 
state as set forth by this test since those statutes granting municipalities enforcement power are not 
considered "general laws." The above test allows for differences in the enforcement of police and 
sanitary regulations on municipal levels from those prescribed by the state. 
In Struthers v. sokol, supra, the court addressed the issue of whether or not a liquor ordinance 
which imposed a greater penalty than a state statute dealing with the same subject, was in conflict 
with general law. The court reiterated its holding in City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 
N.E. 114(1917), which: 
" . . . affirmed the right of a city to regulate the speed of motor vehicles, 
notwithstanding Section 12604, General Code, had already made provisions covering the 
same general subject. It was pointed out in that case that a different penalty was 
prescribed by the ordinance than that prescribed by the statutes of the state, and that fact 
was held to be unimportant and not to create a conflict between the statute and the 
ordinance." Struthers at p. 520. 
In holding there was not a conflict between the city ordinance and the state statute, the Ohio 
Supreme Court held in Struthers, supra: 
"No real conflict can exist unless the ordinance declares something to be right which 
the state law declares to be wrong, or vice versa. There can be no conflict unless one 
authority grants a permit or license to do an act which is forbidden or prohibited by the 
other. No act is either expressly or inferentially permitted or licensed by either of the 
ordinances, or the statutes. On the contrary, all acts referred to are forbidden and 
penalties imposed for violations. * * * In one of the ordinances a slightly heavier 
penalty provided for a second offense, but it has been repeatedly held in many of the 
states, including the state of Ohio, that this is no valid objection. * * * It has repeatedly 
been held that the punishment of an act defined as a crime under a state law does not 
preclude further punishment as a misdemeanor under a municipal ordinance." Id, at p. 
521 (Emphasis added). 
The Ohio Supreme Court in finding that there was no conflict between the ordinances and state 
law, upheld the validity of the ordinance where it imposed a greater penalty than that provided in 
state law for the same offense. 
It is respectfully submitted that this court should rule that the trespass ordinance and the penalty 
ordinance, as drafted, are within the powers granted to Salt Lake City by the State Legislature and 
that the ordinances in question are not in conflict with the general laws of the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, Sections 10-8-50 and 10-8-84, Utah Code Ann. 1953, grant to the City, specific power 
to draft the ordinances in question and provide for the punishment of trespass in the form of fines or 
imprisonment, or by both such fine and imprisonment. This court should rule the ordinances valid as 
drafted and in harmony with the intent and express statement of the Legislature and not in conflict 
with the general laws of the State. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
PAUL G. MAUGHAN 
Assistant City Attorney 
101 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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APPENDIX " A " 
Sec. 32-3-3. Trespass. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to take down any fence, or to let 
down any bars, or to open any gate so as to expose any enclosure, or to ride, drive, walk, lodge, or 
camp or sleep upon the premises of another without the permission of the owner or occupant thereof. 
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or park any motor vehicle, motorcycle or 
motor-driven cycle upon any city owned property not designated for vehicular traffic or parking 
without permission of the board of commissioners of Salt Lake City. 
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate any type of motor vehicle (including but not 
limited to motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies, motor scooters or jeeps) upon the private property 
of another, without first obtaining the written permission of the person in lawful possession of the 
property or, if the property is unoccupied, the owner of such property. 
(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate any type of motor vehicle (including but not 
limited to motorcycles, trail bikes, dune buggies, motor scooters or jeeps) upon any public property, 
except dedicated streets, highways or alleys, without first obtaining the written permission of the 
public entity which is in possession of such property or, if the property is unoccupied, the public 
entity which owns such property. 
(5) Every person who operates any type of motor vehicle upon the private property of another or 
upon any public property, except as hereinabove provided, at all times while so operating such motor 
vehicle shall maintain in his possession the written permission required by the two preceding 
subsections, except that, if the same document grants permission to two or more persons, a person 
named in such document need not have it in his possession while another person named in the same 
document, riding in the same group and not more than three hundred feet from said person, has such 
document in his possession. 
(6) This article does not prohibit the use of such property by the following: 
(a) Emergency vehicles: 
(b) Vehicles of commerce in the course of normal business operations; 
(c) Vehicles being operated on property devoted to commercial or industrial purposes where such 
operation is in conjunction with commercial or industrial use and permission for such operation is 
implied or expressly given by the person in possession of said property; 
(d) Vehicles operated on property actually used for residential purposes where such vehicles are 
there at the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant; 
(e) Vehicles being operated on public or private parking lots where permission to do so is implied 
or expressly given by the person in possession of such lot. 
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